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In this paper we study the retirement patterns of couples in a multi-country setting using
data from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe. In particular we test
whether women’s (men’s) transitions out of the labor force are directly related to the actual
realization of their husbands’(wives’) transition, using the institutional variation in country-
specific early and full statutory retirement ages to instrument the latter. Exploiting the
discontinuities in retirement behavior across countries, we find a significative joint retirement
effect, especially for women, of around 16 to 18 percentage points. For men, we find a similar
but less precise effect. Our empirical strategy allows us to give a causal interpretation to the
effect we estimate. In addition, this effect has important implications for policy analysis.
JEL Codes: J26, D10, C21.
Keywords: Joint retirement, Social security incentives.
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1 Introduction
Continued improvements in life expectancy and fiscal insolvency of public pensions have led
to an increase in pension entitlement ages in several countries, especially for women for whom
eligibility ages for retirement pensions have been traditionally lower than for men in multiple
countries. The success of such policies, however, relies on how responsive individuals are to
such changes in pension eligibility. In this paper we use longitudinal data from the Survey of
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to study the determinants of retirement
decisions among European couples and how responsive each member of the couple is to their
own eligibility to retirement pensions, as well as their partner’s eligibility induced retirement
choice, after controlling for other factors that may affect their retirement decisions.
Numerous studies have shown the importance of Social Security incentives for retirement
decisions. The timing of retirement has been found to be in part determined by the incentives
imbedded in the rules determining Social Security benefits, as well as employer-provided pension
benefits (see Hurd, 1990 and Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999 for reviews). Likewise, other cross-
national research published volumes edited by Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) note that there is
a strong negative correlation between labor force participation at older ages and the generosity
of early retirement benefits. Finally, Coe and Zamarro (2011) find that offi cial retirement ages
in Europe are a strong predictor of retirement for men. However, these studies focused mostly
on men and little is known about the determinants of women’s retirement decisions.
Recent research has also stressed the role of other "push" factors in determining the timing
of labor market exit. In particular, labor market constraints (Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder,
2008; García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín, 2008), poor health (Currie and Madrian, 1999) or
family care-giving obligations (Crespo, 2006; Fevang, Kverndokk and Røed, 2008) have also
been found to have implications on the timing of retirement and may help explain gender
differences in employment behavior among men and women.
Finally, this paper contributes to the increasing literature that studies joint retirement and
considers retirement as a decision concerning the couple, rather than the individual (Ruhm,
1996; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000, 2004, 2009; Blau and Gilleskie, 2006; Coile, 2004a, 2004b;
Michaud, 2003; Michaud and Vermulen, 2004; Casanova, 2010; Stancanelli and van Soest, 2012a,
2012b; Stancanelli, 2012; Honoré and de Paula, 2013). The phenomenon of joint retirement
refers to the coincidence in time of spouses’ retirement and follows the observation that a
significant proportion of spouses retire within less than one year of each other, independently
of the age difference between them. In this paper we then focus on the retirement patterns of
couples and study the complementarity of spouses’retirement patterns in continental Europe.
This study complements the one of Banks, Blundell and Casanova (2010) for England and the
US who, focusing on men, found that British men are from 14 to 20 percentage points more
likely to retire when their wife reaches state pension age at 60 than their American counterparts.
Considering the numerous differences in the labor markets, health insurance and social plans
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of the U.K. and U.S. in comparison with many European countries, there is no a priori reason
to assume that their findings would still hold. In addition, we are interested on studying both
women’s and men’s transitions out of the labor force and how they directly relate to the actual
realization of their husbands’(wives’) transition, using the institutional variation in country-
specific early and normal retirement ages to instrument the latter.
We find significant evidence of complementarity on spouses’transitions out of the labor force.
The probability of women leaving the labor force increases in around 16 to 18 percentage points
when their husbands also stop working. We also find similar effect sizes for men but less precise.
Controlling for spouse’s working status reduces the impact of own eligibility for retirement
pensions on the probability of leaving the labor force. In particular, the effect is reduced in
about 3 and 4 percentage points for early retirement and, about 6 and 3 percentage points for full
retirement pensions, for men and women respectively. Therefore, by ignoring joint retirement
governments would be overstating the impact of eligibility rules on retirement decisions. Finally,
we also found substantial heterogeneity in the effect of eligibility for retirement pensions and
joint retirement depending on policies in place concerning female early retirement ages. Our
empirical strategy allows us to give a causal interpretation to these effects we estimate as we
control for the potential endogeneity and simultaneity of spouse’s retirement decisions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and key variables for
the analysis. Section 3 discusses the empirical reduced form model and identification strategy.
In section 4 we present descriptive statistics on spouse’s retirement behaviors and econometric
results from estimating our empirical model. Finally we conclude in section 5.
2 Data
This paper uses data from the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE),
a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database of micro data on health, socioeconomic
status and social and family networks of more than 40,000 individuals aged 50 or over. The
main purpose of this survey is to provide detailed information about the living conditions of
middle-aged and older people for several countries in Europe. SHARE contains a balanced rep-
resentation of the various European regions, ranging from Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden),
Central Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands) and
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy and Greece). Further data have been collected in 2005-06
in Israel. The Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland joined SHARE in 2006 and only started
participating during the second wave of data collection in 2006-07.
SHARE collects information on health variables (self-reported health, health conditions,
physical and cognitive functioning, health behavior, use of health care facilities), biomark-
ers (grip strength, body-mass index, peak flow), psychological variables (psychological health,
well-being, life satisfaction), economic variables (current work activity, job characteristics, op-
portunities to work past retirement age, sources and composition of current income, wealth
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and consumption, housing, education), and social support variables (assistance within families,
transfers of income and assets, social networks, volunteer activities), both at household and
individual level. This gives the possibility to analyze a wide variety of questions related to
population ageing and the quality of life of the elderly.
In addition, following Coe and Zamarro (2011) we supplemented the SHARE dataset with
information regarding country and gender specific statutory ages of eligibility for early and full
retirement pensions in order to construct instruments based on dummy variables indicating
whether the individual is above the full or early retirement ages set in his country. Table 1
reports the statutory Early and Normal retirement ages in place in each country, jointly with
the Effective age of stop working obtained from SHARE.1 As it can be seen in this table, the
offi cial retirement ages in Europe vary by country, and sometimes by gender, by as much as 8
years. In most countries, the effective age of retirement is well below the offi cial age of receiving
a full old-age pension and females are found to retire around one to two years earlier than males,
especially those who are married or cohabiting with a partner.
Table 1: Retirement Age.
Males Females
Early Normal Effective Early Normal Effective
All Married All Married
Austria 60 65 59 58 55 60 56 55
Belgium 60 65 58 58 60 65 57 56
Denmark 65 65 61 61 65 65 60 60
France 57 60 59 59 57 60 59 58
Germany 60 65 60 60 60 65 60 59
Greece 57 65 60 60 57 65 60 60
Italy 57 65 58 58 57 65 57 56
Netherlands 60 65 60 60 60 65 59 58
Spain 60 65 62 61 60 65 61 59
Sweden 61 65 63 63 61 65 62 62
Switzerland 63 65 64 63 62 64 62 62
Source: SHARE (2004, 2006/07). Effective age = weighted median age of stop working.
1The main source for this data was Coe and Zamarro (2011). The offi cial retirement ages are referred to the
law that was in place when individuals in SHARE were facing their retirement decisions. The effective retirement
age is obtained as the weighted median age of stop working for those respondents who were working at age 50.
3
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Country
Men Women
Notes: Sample size: Men=16,127; Women=19,150. Brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.
2.1 Sample
This paper uses data from the first two waves of SHARE (2004 and 2006/07) for the eleven
countries for which we have longitudinal data available (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). In particular, our
analysis sample consists of couples who reported being working in wave 1 with both members
aged between 50 and 69. After dropping those observations with incomplete, our sample has
1,275 such couples.2
Given that our aim is to measure the causal effect of joint retirement we focus the analysis
on working couples in the first wave of data and study their retirement transitions in the second
wave. However, it should be stressed out that, for some countries, this sample would not be
representative of the whole middle-age and older population, especially for women. This is so
because, as shown in Figure 1, some European countries (notably the Mediterranean countries)
have very high proportions of women who never worked.
Moreover, a large proportion of women who ever worked but stopped before age 50 did so
at the early stages of their careers (see bimodal histogram shapes in Figure 2 for females in
countries like Italy, the Netherlands or Spain). Many of those early career stops are, however,
not related to retirement decisions and so they are excluded from our analysis.
Some other descriptive statistics by country and gender can be found in Table A.2. The
average age of men in our sample is 58 and 56 for women. Eight per cent of men and a three
percent of women are over the normal retirement age, while 32 and 20, respectively, are over
the early retirement age. While the average age between men and women in our sample is
2More details on our sample selection can be found in the Appendix A.
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Note: Sample size: Men=16,080; Women=16,751.
significantly different, the percentage being out of the labor force is very similar for both males
and females (16 and 15 per cent). However, significant gender differences arise when we look
at the proportion actually describing themselves as retired (13 per cent for men and 8 per cent
for women). This is so because a higher percentage of women than men describe themselves as
housemakers (4 per cent for women and 0.5 per cent for men). Given these differences, we define
retired as making a transition out of work between the two waves of data. That is, we consider
a respondent as having retired if she is active in the first wave and inactive in the second wave.
A respondent is considered active when she describes herself as working in the paid labor force,
and inactive otherwise.3 Finally, educational attainments and health status are similar among
males and females in our sample.
3 Empirical model
We aim to determine the effect of having a spouse leaving the labor force on the respondent’s
probability of retirement. In particular, let Ri be a binary indicator that takes value 1 if
respondent i leaves the labor force, and let Rj(i) be another indicator that takes value 1 if her
spouse j(i) also transitions to retirement in the second wave of data. Then, we consider a
3 In the empirical analysis we also use the probability of self-reported retirement status as the dependent
variable and results are robust to this alternative definition.
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(ui, εi) ∼ N(0,Σ)
where i = {h,w} stands for husbands and wives, respectively. β is our main parameter of
interest, X is a vector of explanatory variables containing demographic information for both






. Dearlyi is an indicator for eligibility for
early retirement pensions, which is defined as:
Dearlyi =
{
1 if individual i’s age is above the early offi cial retirement age in the country
0 , otherwise
,
and similarly Dnormali is an indicator for eligibility for full retirement pensions defined as:
Dnormali =
{





j(i) are our external instruments for retirement decisions, that is, they are the
exclusion restrictions that allow identification of the model. In particular, we assume that -
conditional on observables - whether the spouse is eligible for retirement pensions only has
an impact on the individual’s retirement decision through the partner’s retirement decision,
as opposed to directly having an effect. The vector of explanatory variables X includes a
series of controls for the individual and partner’s characteristics, such as the age difference
between the members of the couple, level of education and health status of each member,
family composition (whether they have children and/or grandchildren), and country dummies.
Under this assumption our estimates of β are interpreted as the effect of the spouse’s retirement
induced through eligibility for retirement pensions on the individual’s retirement decision.
Our econometric approach exploits the fact that the regressor of interest (transition into
retirement) is partly determined by a known discontinuous (non-linear and non-monotonic)
function of an observed covariate (age) to control for the endogeneity of partner’s retirement
decisions. This sort of identification strategy has a long tradition in social science and can be
viewed as an application of a regression discontinuity design for evaluating the effect of joint
retirement.4 In addition, by estimating the equations for both members of the couple jointly
we also take into account the potential correlation among unobservables across partners due to
the simultaneity of their decisions.
4For literature reviews of regression discontinuity methods see Imbens and Lemieux 2007, Van der Klaauw
2008, or Lee and Lemieux 2010. For applications of regression discontinuity to the retirement decision see also
Battistin et al. 2009, and Stancanelli and Van Soest 2012a, 2012b.
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4 Results
4.1 Employment Rates and Joint Retirement Across SHARE Countries
Table 2 reports SHARE participation rates, defined as the employment to population ratios, for
all respondents between 50 and 64 years old. We find that the average participation rate in this
age group is of 49 per cent, being 58 per cent for males and only 41 per cent for females. Italy,
Austria, Belgium and Spain are in the group of European countries with lowest participation
rates (or highest "unused labor capacity"). In addition, countries vary substantially in their
gender differences in participation rates, ranging from a difference of 4.79 in Sweden to one of
41.84 in Greece.
Table 2: Employment/population ratios (50-64 years).
Country Total Males Females Difference
Austria 38.77 49.40 28.56 20.84
Belgium 43.15 51.20 35.28 15.92
Denmark 64.22 69.00 59.45 9.55
France 51.07 54.67 47.70 6.97
Germany 53.95 59.71 48.33 11.38
Greece 49.23 70.99 29.15 41.84
Italy 37.04 49.62 25.30 24.32
Netherlands 52.42 62.90 41.79 21.11
Spain 44.82 60.90 29.73 31.17
Sweden 73.63 76.01 71.22 4.79
Switzerland 69.54 79.11 59.96 19.15
Total 49.23 58.19 40.65 17.54
Source: SHARE (2004, 2006/07). Weighted means.
Underlying these cross-country differences in labor participation rates of older workers are
very different trends over time for males and females in these countries (see Figure 3). Par-
ticipation rates for older men have fallen substantially since the 70’s in most countries but by
much more in some countries than in others. For instance, participation rates for men aged 55
to 59 dropped 22.7 percentage points in France in between 1975 and 2007, 11.6 in Spain and
8.1 in Germany. In contrast, labor participation rates for older women have been in the rise
in all SHARE countries. However, this increase has been also much bigger in some countries
than in others. For example, labor participation rates of women aged 50 to 54 increased by
48.2 percentage points in The Netherlands in between 1975 and 2007 while in Spain they only
increased by 26.5 percentage points.
We also find descriptive evidence of joint retirement across SHARE countries. As mentioned
7
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Source: SHARE (2004, 2006/07). Retirement age gap = weighted mean of differences between the age
of stop working for the husband and the age of stop working for his wife.
before, joint retirement refers to the coincidence in time of spouses’retirement and follows the
observation that a significant share of spouses retire within less than one year of each other,
independently of the age difference between them. Figure 4 shows the histogram of the age
differences between spouses using couples from the first two waves of SHARE. The average gap
between the husband’s age and the wife’s age is of 3 years, being this difference quite stable
across SHARE countries (with the only exception of Greece, where the average differential is of
5 years). The figure also shows that, as predicted by the joint retirement hypothesis, there is a
positive correlation between the within couple age gap and the difference between the age the
husband stopped working and the age his wife did so.
Figures 5 and 6 describe labor market and retirement patterns of couples in our sample.
That is, we describe gender differences on self-reported labor market status of respondents
in wave 2, conditional on having reported being in the paid labor force in wave 1. Figure 5
shows the proportion of respondents reporting non-working (OLF) as well as the proportion of
respondents defining their work status as retired, by gender and country. We find that even in
this homogeneous sample there are remarkable differences between men and women, and across
countries. Finally, figure 6 presents percentages of respondents out of the labor force in wave
2 by whether their spouse reports being also out of the labor force. We find that the fraction
of workers that reports not working in wave 2 is higher, for both men and women and at every
age interval, when the partner also reports being not working.
9
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Notes: Wave 2. Sample size: Men=1,275; Women=1,275.
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Notes: Wave 2. Sample size: Men=1,275; Women=1,275.
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4.2 Estimation Results
In this section we present the results of estimating the system of equations (1). Tables 3 and
4 show marginal effects of estimates for men and women respectively of probit models for the
probability of leaving the labor force (OLF) in the second wave of data, given that the respondent
was working in the first wave. Each section of the table, 1 to 4, incorporates additional controls
to the analysis. In particular, section 1 only includes dummy variables for the respondent being
eligible for retirement ages as well as a control for the age difference among the members of the
couple; Section 2 adds education variables; Section 3 adds health status controls; and Section 4
includes information on whether the respondent has children and grandchildren in the analysis
as a measure of care necessities. Within each section of the table we present results of models
that ignore the possibility of joint retirement by excluding information on working status of the
spouse, and preferred bivariate probit models where we include this variable and instrument it
with the dummies for eligibility pensions of the spouse. In this respect, we only use eligibility
for early retirement pensions to instrument for wife’s work status in the models for men and
both, eligibility for early and full retirement pensions to instrument for husband’s work status in
the models for women. This is so, because the proportion of wife’s above full retirement age for
men that are inactive is only nine per cent and so, for the decision of retirement of the husband
turns out to be more important if the wife becomes eligible for early retirement pensions.
Our results show that there is a significative joint retirement effect, especially for women,
of around 16 to 18 percentage points. For men, we find a similar but less precise effect. These
results are similar in size to those found by Banks, Blundell and Casanova (2010) for British men.
Introducing information on working status of the spouse reduces the impact of own eligibility
for retirement pensions in about 3 and 4 percentage points for early retirement and, about 6 and
3 percentage points for full retirement pensions, for men and women respectively. Therefore,
by ignoring joint retirement governments would be overstating the impact of eligibility rules on
retirement decisions. The remainder of the variables have the expected effects. Higher levels
of education lower the probability of leaving the labor force but only for men. Bad health
has a positive impact on the probability of leaving the labor force for both men and women,
while the spouse having bad health has a negative effect but only for women. Finally, having
grandchildren increases the probability of leaving the labor force for both men and women.5
In order for the offi cial retirement ages to be valid instruments, they must be exogenous
and relevant. With respect to the exogeneity assumption, we make the assumption that if the
husband (wife) reaches the statutory retirement age, his (her) spouse retirement decision is only
affected through his (her) own transition. This assumption is not testable. Regarding relevance,
statutory retirement ages must be related to actual retirement behavior. To illustrate this latter
point we estimated probit regressions of the individual probability of the partner leaving the
labor force (LF), separately for husbands and wives. This set of regressions would represent a
5We also estimated models controlling for household income in the first wave and household wealth but this
did not change our main results. Estimates for these models are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner leaving LF 0.298*** 0.229*** 0.186** 0.126
(0.067) (0.084) (0.090) (0.096)
Age>early 0.140*** 0.084*** 0.138*** 0.097*** 0.143*** 0.110*** 0.129*** 0.109***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028)
Age>full 0.212*** 0.132*** 0.209*** 0.155*** 0.201*** 0.162*** 0.192*** 0.171***
(0.030) (0.042) (0.030) (0.042) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.038)
Age difference 0.003 0.008** 0.003 0.007* 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
High education -0.118*** -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.100*** -0.100***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Medium edu. -0.027 -0.033 -0.026 -0.031 -0.030 -0.033
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Partner high edu. 0.010 0.023 0.016 0.026 0.020 0.026
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Partner med. edu. -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.008
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Bad health 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.073***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Partner bad health 0.018 0.005 0.023 0.013
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Having children -0.017 -0.015
(0.019) (0.019)
Having grandchild 0.085*** 0.073***
(0.019) (0.021)
Log-likelihood -926.77 -917.61 -912.87 -905.86 -903.58 -897.38 -890.70 -885.86
ρ 0.253 -0.591 0.247 -0.401 0.259 -0.262 0.247 -0.112
(0.066) (0.211) (0.067) (0.253) (0.067) (0.272) (0.068) (0.293)
LR test of ρ = 0 13.677 4.536 12.617 1.884 13.834 0.818 12.251 0.141
[0.000] [0.033] [0.000] [0.170] [0.000] [0.366] [0.000] [0.707]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uh, εh). p-values in squared brackets.
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Table 4: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner leaving LF 0.163** 0.182** 0.157** 0.163**
(0.081) (0.072) (0.074) (0.075)
Age>early 0.190*** 0.147*** 0.190*** 0.141*** 0.190*** 0.150*** 0.127*** 0.136***
(0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.033) (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) (0.032)
Age>full 0.164*** 0.132*** 0.163*** 0.130*** 0.172*** 0.143*** 0.197*** 0.143***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.046)
Age difference 0.007** 0.001 0.006* 0.000 0.007** 0.001 0.006* 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
High education -0.046 -0.046 -0.039 -0.040 -0.036 -0.038
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Medium edu. -0.033 -0.031 -0.027 -0.026 -0.025 -0.024
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Partner high edu. 0.015 0.039 0.014 0.035 0.022 0.041
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Partner med. edu. 0.042 0.048* 0.041 0.047* 0.040 0.046*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Bad health 0.074*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.070***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Partner bad health -0.053* -0.068** -0.053* -0.068**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Having children -0.009 -0.006
(0.019) (0.019)
Having grandchild 0.059*** 0.043**
(0.020) (0.020)
Log-likelihood -920.23 -913.47 -906.38 -898.88 -896.07 -888.97 -883.29 -877.29
ρ 0.273 -0.191 0.268 -0.254 0.284 -0.168 0.270 -0.209
(0.066) (0.244) (0.067) (0.220) (0.067) (0.226) (0.068) (0.231)
LR test of ρ = 0 15.756 0.582 14.731 1.186 16.523 0.518 14.565 0.742
[0.000] [0.445] [0.000] [0.276] [0.000] [0.472] [0.000] [0.389]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uw, εw). p-values in squared brackets.
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standard first-stage step in a two-stage estimation procedure such as an IV probit.6 Our results
show that eligibility for retirement pensions are a significant predictor of retirement decisions
both for husbands and wives. Estimated marginal effects for these regressions can be found in
the tables B.1 and B.2 of the Appendix.
In order to get a better insight of the effect of policies on pension entitlement ages on
retirement behaviors of couples, we also estimate previous probit models dividing the countries
in our sample in two groups. Group 1 include those countries with female early retirement
ages that are below 60 (Austria, France, Greece, and Italy), while group 2 contains countries
with female early retirement ages of 60 or more (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). The results of these regressions can be found in tables 5 and
6. An interesting result is that for those countries where the female early retirement age is
below 60, for both men and women’s retirement decisions it turns out to be more important
whether the respondent is eligible for early retirement pensions than whether he/she reaches
full retirement age. In contrast, for countries with women early retirement ages above 60 both
men and women react more to eligibility for full retirement pensions. For countries in group 1
with lower early retirement ages for women, whether the wife retires has a bigger impact on the
husband’s retirement decision than in countries in group 2 with higher female early retirement
ages. The opposite is true for women, whether the husband also retires appears to be more
important in countries with higher female early retirement ages than in countries with lower
female early retirement age. These results for countries with lower female early retirement ages
are in line with those of Stancanelli, 2012 who, using data from France, found that husband’s
retirement probability increases slightly when the wife reaches early retirement age while her
retirement probability is not responsive to her husband’s early retirement age.
Finally, in order to assess the robustness of our results to different specifications we also
estimate models for the probability that the respondent describes himself as retired as opposed
to out of the labor force. The results of these regressions can be found in the Appendix in
tables B.3 and B.4. Our results are still robust to this alternative definition of the dependent
variable and we find a significant joint retirement effect of similar magnitude for men, whereas
for women the effect gets reduced to about half the size (notice that while the percentage being
out of the labor force in our sample is very similar for both males and females, the proportion
actually describing themselves as retired was significantly higher for men). Another difference
with these results is that bad health and partner’s bad health does not seem to have an impact
on retirement decisions for women in this case. This suggests that bad health shocks might lead
women to rather leave the labor force without actually retiring.
6 In practice, we follow a more effi cient approach and estimate the whole bivariate model by maximum likelihood
in a single step.
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Table 5: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Partner leaving LF 0.356*** 0.219** 0.282** 0.171 0.058 0.146 0.036 0.079
(0.054) (0.100) (0.099) (0.113) (0.217) (0.104) (0.195) (0.103)
Age>early 0.098** 0.072** 0.124** 0.075** 0.188*** 0.085*** 0.192*** 0.072**
(0.043) (0.033) (0.052) (0.033) (0.062) (0.033) (0.057) (0.032)
Age>full 0.029 0.225*** 0.064 0.234*** 0.127* 0.229*** 0.133** 0.242***
(0.045) (0.054) (0.057) (0.052) (0.070) (0.048) (0.063) (0.045)
Age difference 0.006 0.009** 0.002 0.008** -0.005 0.008* -0.006 0.007*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
High education -0.136** -0.099*** -0.163*** -0.090*** -0.165*** -0.075**
(0.058) (0.034) (0.060) (0.035) (0.060) (0.035)
Medium edu. -0.058 -0.023 -0.043 -0.020 -0.042 -0.022
(0.043) (0.029) (0.053) (0.029) (0.053) (0.028)
Partner high edu. 0.072 0.008 0.070 0.012 0.070 0.013
(0.056) (0.032) (0.064) (0.033) (0.064) (0.032)
Partner med. edu. 0.052 -0.019 0.052 -0.015 0.051 -0.007
(0.044) (0.029) (0.049) (0.030) (0.051) (0.030)
Bad health 0.039 0.079*** 0.036 0.069**
(0.062) (0.028) (0.061) (0.028)
Partner bad health 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.024
(0.051) (0.030) (0.051) (0.030)
Having children -0.022 -0.012
(0.037) (0.021)
Having grandchild 0.214*** 0.108***
(0.081) (0.024)
N. observations 340 935 340 935 340 935 340 935
Log-likelihood -238.47 -673.61 -230.64 -666.80 -227.56 -660.24 -225.60 -645.38
ρ -0.826 -0.375 -0.581 -0.250 0.205 -0.173 0.282 -0.022
(0.203) (0.280) (0.352) (0.322) (0.686) (0.303) (0.600) (0.315)
LR test of ρ = 0 3.379 1.464 1.565 0.550 0.075 0.312 0.174 0.005
[0.066] [0.226] [0.211] [0.458] [0.784] [0.576] [0.676] [0.945]
Notes: All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uh, εh). p-values in squared brackets.
Group 1 = countries with female early retirement age below 60 (AT, FR, GR, IT);
Group 2 = countries with female early retirement age 60 or more (BE, DK, DE, NL, ES, SE, SW).
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Table 6: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Partner leaving LF 0.139 0.161* 0.171 0.175** 0.167 0.151* 0.176 0.172**
(0.152) (0.087) (0.134) (0.081) (0.160) (0.082) (0.163) (0.078)
Age>early 0.158*** 0.143*** 0.156*** 0.139*** 0.172*** 0.146*** 0.155** 0.129***
(0.058) (0.041) (0.054) (0.040) (0.060) (0.039) (0.062) (0.038)
Age>full 0.106 0.158** 0.127* 0.152** 0.146** 0.164** 0.141** 0.159**
(0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
Age difference 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
High education -0.089* -0.031 -0.101* -0.024 -0.103* -0.020
(0.057) (0.033) (0.056) (0.034) (0.056) (0.035)
Medium edu. -0.075 -0.015 -0.087* -0.009 -0.097** -0.004
(0.046) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030)
Partner high edu. 0.030 0.041 0.048 0.033 0.056 0.040
(0.059) (0.035) (0.060) (0.035) (0.060) (0.035)
Partner med. edu. 0.093** 0.030 0.117** 0.026 0.116** 0.025
(0.046) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.046) (0.030)
Bad health 0.087* 0.061** 0.091** 0.062**
(0.047) (0.028) (0.046) (0.028)
Partner bad health -0.180** -0.049 -0.171** -0.052
(0.078) (0.034) (0.078) (0.034)
Having children -0.029 -0.018
(0.035) (0.022)
Having grandchild 0.067* 0.037
(0.037) (0.024)
N. observations 340 935 340 935 340 935 340 935
Log-likelihood -237.77 -669.35 -227.05 -661.62 -222.02 -654.76 -219.69 -639.83
ρ -0.030 -0.218 -0.170 -0.257 -0.116 -0.178 -0.146 -0.274
(0.503) (0.253) (0.470) (0.236) (0.576) (0.240) (0.604) (0.230)
LR test of ρ = 0 0.003 0.683 0.131 1.038 0.042 0.504 0.060 1.198
[0.952] [0.409] [0.717] [0.308] [0.837] [0.477] [0.806] [0.274]
Notes: All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uw, εw). p-values in squared brackets.
Group 1 = countries with female early retirement age below 60 (AT, FR, GR, IT);
Group 2 = countries with female early retirement age 60 or more (BE, DK, DE, NL, ES, SE, SW).
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5 Conclusions
Continued improvements in life expectancy and fiscal insolvency of public pensions have led to
an increase in pension entitlement ages in several countries. For example, the normal retirement
age in the U.S. is currently rising from 65 to 67 for successive birth cohorts. England, Austria,
Germany and Italy are also phasing in increases in their retirement ages. However, the success
of such policies relies on how responsive individuals are to such changes in pension eligibility.
In this paper we use longitudinal data from SHARE to study the determinants of retirement
decisions among European couples and how responsive each member of the couple is to their
own eligibility to retirement pensions, as well as their partner’s eligibility induced retirement
choice, after controlling for other factors that may affect their retirement decisions.
Our empirical strategy exploits the discontinuities in retirement behavior across countries
to control for the endogeneity of partner’s labor participation decisions and takes into account
the simultaneity of labor decisions within couples. This allows us to give a causal interpretation
to the effects we estimate. Our results show a significative joint retirement effect, especially for
women, of around 16 to 18 percentage points. For men, we find a similar but less precise effect.
We also compare our estimates with models that do not control for the partner’s labor
participation decisions and found that introducing information on working status of the spouse
reduces the impact of own eligibility for retirement pensions in about 3 and 4 percentage points
for early retirement and, about 6 and 3 percentage points for full retirement pensions, for
men and women respectively. Therefore, by ignoring joint retirement governments would be
overstating the impact of eligibility rules on retirement decisions.
We also found substantial heterogeneity in the effect of eligibility for retirement pensions
and joint retirement depending on the policies for female early retirement. In particular, by
grouping countries depending on their female early retirement age, we found that eligibility for
early retirement pensions seems to be a more important determinant of both men and women’s
retirement decisions in countries with lower female early retirement age than in countries with
higher early retirement ages for women. In addition, for countries with lower early retirement
ages for women, whether the wife retires has a bigger impact on the husband’s retirement
decision than in countries with higher female early retirement ages. The opposite is true for
women, whether the husband also retires appears to be more important in countries with higher
female early retirement ages than in countries with lower female early retirement age.
Finally, our results are still robust to using self-reported retirement status as an alternative
definition of the dependent variable. In this case, we find a significant joint retirement effect of
similar magnitude for men while for women the effect gets reduced to about half the size.
As recent pension reforms that increase pension entitlement ages get established and new
waves of data get collected, it would be good to analyze how these reforms are affecting re-
tirement patterns of men and women. In addition, future research should study whether joint
retirement effects get affected once retirement ages of women get equalized to those for men.
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A Sample selection and composition
Starting point: SHARE waves 1 and 2 - merged files (Balanced panel: 37,482 observations).
Filters:
1. We keep married individuals who answered their own interview as the household’s refer-
ence person or as his/her spouse or partner = Sample (25,004 observations).
2. We drop couples with incomplete records = Sample (19,318 observations).
3. We select individuals aged 50-69 = Sample (9,850 observations).
4. Keep only those couples in which both were working at wave 1 = SAMPLE (1,275 couples
and 2,550 observations).















Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics by gender.
[1] Men [2] Women Dif=[1]-[2]
Age 57.895 56.300 1.595***
(3.751) (3.435)
Over Early Age 0.322 0.201 0.121***
Over Normal Age 0.085 0.032 0.052***
Out of the labor force 0.165 0.153 0.012
Declared as retired 0.127 0.076 0.051***
Housemakers 0.005 0.040 -0.035***
Bad Health 0.133 0.147 -0.013
Low Education 0.267 0.285 -0.019
Medium Education 0.386 0.357 0.029*
High Education 0.347 0.358 -0.010
Dummy of having children 0.622
Dummy of having grandchildren 0.496
Notes: Wave 2. Standard deviations of non-binary variables in parentheses.
Significant at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level.
B Additional tables
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Table B.1: Probit (Average marginal effects): Partner leaving LF (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner age>early 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.235*** 0.216***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Age>early 0.046 0.044 0.038 0.035
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Age>full 0.089** 0.086** 0.087** 0.085**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Age difference 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
High education 0.011 0.010 0.018
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Medium edu. 0.039 0.038 0.036
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Partner high edu. -0.041 -0.035 -0.032
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Partner med. edu. -0.027 -0.021 -0.019
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Bad health -0.042 -0.042
(0.024) (0.024)






Pseudo R2 0.152 0.157 0.165 0.172
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table B.2: Probit (Average marginal effects): Partner leaving LF (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner age>early 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.113***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Partner age>full 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.293*** 0.285***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070)
Age>early 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.089**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Age>full -0.060 -0.063 -0.065 -0.061
(0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Age difference 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
High education 0.019 0.025 0.028
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Medium edu. -0.002 0.005 0.006
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Partner high edu. -0.112*** -0.105*** -0.097***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Partner med. edu. -0.027 -0.027 -0.030
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Bad health 0.018 0.024
(0.028) (0.028)






Pseudo R2 0.192 0.212 0.220 0.234
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table B.3: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Retiring (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner retiring 0.221*** 0.213*** 0.215** 0.181**
(0.065) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072)
Age>early 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.092***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Age>full 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.123***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Age difference 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High education -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.089***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Medium edu. -0.024 -0.025 -0.027
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Partner high edu. 0.037 0.039 0.045*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Partner med. edu. -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Bad health -0.046* -0.050**
(0.025) (0.025)






Log-likelihood -593.30 -582.44 -579.25 -566.91
ρ -0.285 -0.263 -0.273 -0.162
(0.248) (0.269) (0.268) (0.287)
LR test of ρ = 0 1.051 0.812 0.875 0.286
[0.305] [0.367] [0.349] [0.593]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%,
** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uh, εh). p-values in squared brackets.
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Table B.4: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Retiring (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner retiring 0.108** 0.112** 0.104** 0.088*
(0.052) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048)
Age>early 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.097***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Age>full 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.094***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Age difference -0.007** -0.006* -0.006* -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High education 0.012 0.011 0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Medium edu. -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Partner high edu. 0.019 0.016 0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Partner med. edu. 0.038** 0.038** 0.037*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Bad health -0.012 -0.010
(0.018) (0.018)






Log-likelihood -585.86 -573.51 -570.89 -559.05
ρ -0.067 -0.089 -0.038 0.046
(0.297) (0.284) (0.291) (0.287)
LR test of ρ = 0 0.050 0.097 0.017 0.026
[0.823] [0.755] [0.897] [0.871]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%,
** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uw, εw). p-values in squared brackets.
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